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RECENT CASES
CRIMINAL LAw-FORMER JEOPARDY-RIGHT OF STATE To APPEAL FROM DIVERDICT D was granted a directed verdict at the close of the state s
case on a charge of grand larceny The state appealed under REM REV
STAT § 2183-1(5), which gives the state the right to appeal for error based
on "any order which in effect abates or determines the action, or discontinues the same otherwise than by an acquittal of the defendant by a jury:
Provided That in no case shall the state have a right to an appeal where
the defendant has been acquitted by a jury" D moved to dismiss the
appeal Held: Motion denied and case remanded Though the jury returned a verdict of not guilty, it did so at the direction of the court; therefore, D was not acquitted by a jury within the meaning of the statute as
it had performed a mere ministerial act State v Portee, 125 Wash Dec
235, 170 P (2d) 326 (1946)
The above statute was held to be constitutional in State v Brunn, 22
Wn (2d) 120 154 P (2d) 826, 157 A L R 1049 (1945) That case is one of
the most significant in criminal proceedings ever decided in this jurisdiction In it, the state appealed from an erroneous order of the trial
court granting the respondent's motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the
evidence In an excellent opinion the court held that the statute allowing
the appeal did not violate the double jeopardy clause of Art I, § 9 of the
Constitution of the state of Washington The court set down the following
criterion for jeopardy in Washington: There has been no jeopardy until
there has been one correct trial free from error unless the jury returns
a verdict for the defendant The court recognized that the state as well
as the defendant had a right to a trial free from error, that the legislature
has the right to fix the rules of criminal procedure, and that the rule fixed
by this statute did not violate the double jeopardy section The legislature
did not provide for appeal by the state after acquittal by jury Whether
they could is an open question in Washington
The rule of the instant case filled the loophole left by State v Brunn,
supra A directed verdict is not an acquittal by jury The state can appeal
from a directed verdict as well as from a dismissal, thus eliminating 'oneman" acquittals
The Washington position on double jeopardy is in the minor' v, but is
an advanced position and one that is clearly in accord with , :e trend
State v Lee, 65 Conn 265, 30 Atl 1110 27 L R A 498 48 Am St Rep 202
(1894); Holmes' dissent in Kepner v U S 195 U S 100 49 L ed 114 (1904);
State v Felch, 92 Vt 477, 105 Atl 23 (1918); Palko v Connecticut, 302 U S
319, 82 L ed 288 (1937); State v Witte, 243 Wis 423, 10 N W (2d) 117 (1943)
The former Washington rule and the rule in the majority of jurisdictions is
that constitutional peril has attached when the jury has been impane.d and
sworn and no new trial is allowed if the jury is discharged without the accused's consent, or any sufficient reason 1 BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL LAW (9th
ed 1923) § 1012 et seq ; State v Kinghorn, 56 Wash 131, 105 Pac 234 27 L R
A (N s ) 136 (1909) This rule has developed many exceptions (15 Am Jur.
75, Criminal Law §§ 406-433) and is slowly breaking down into the present
Washington position The American Law Institute has adopted a positon
allowing appeal by the state whenever material error has occurred at the
trial A L I ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINAL LAW Official Draft (August
15 1935) p 13 §§ 13-14 Should the Washington legislature adopt a position
RECTED
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allowing state appeal whenever there is error in the trial, even after
acquittal by jury, it will be interesting to note whether the Washington
S W P
Supreme Court will hold it constitutional
DIvoRcE-ESTOPPEL OF PROCURING PARTY-FoREIGN DIvoRCES-EsToPPEL TO
ATTAcK-CHANGE 3n POSITION In an action for divorce on grounds of cruelty,
it appeared that P wife, under the influence of D, had already obtained a
divorce in Idaho, and D had thereafter remarried P maintained this prior
divorce was invalid, that the Idaho court had no jurisdiction because P
had never established a bona fide domicile in Idaho The trial court upheld
D's contention that P, the procuring party, was estopped from collaterally
attacking the validity of the Idaho divorce, and dismissed the action
Held, reversing the trial court: Estoppel does not lie here In a divorce
action the procuring party may collaterally impeach a decree of divorce
granted in the courts of another state by proving neither party had a
bona fide domicile within that other state-even when the record purports
to show such domicile Wampler v Wampler, 125 Wash Dec 246, 170
P (2d) 316 (1946)
In such an action, at least one of the spouses must have a bona fide
domicile within a state to give jurisdiction to the courts of that state
Dormitzer v German Savings & Loan Society, 23 Wash 132, 62 Pac 862
Affirming the Dormitzer case, the United States Supreme Court
(1900)
held that collateral impeachment of a divorce decree granted in another
state by proof the court had no jurisdiction, even when the record purports to show jurisdiction, violates neither the Full Faith and Credit
Clause nor the principles of comity German Savings & Loan Society v
Dormitzer, 192 U S 125, 48 L ed 373, 24 Sup Ct 221 (1904) Based on
this reasoning, the recent holding in Mapes v Mapes, 124 Wash Dec
716, 167 P (2d) 405 (1946), serves as a warning that evasive divorces
procured in states whose laws facilitate the operation of divorce mills
are void in Washington This decision mirrors the much debated United
States Supreme Court opinion in Williams v North Carolina, 325 U S 226,
89 L ed 1577, 65 Sup Ct 1092, 157 A. L R 1366 (1945)
It will be noted that in the Mapes, Williams and Dormitzer cases, supra,
it was not the procuring party who attacked the decree The Wampler case
supra, poses the added question: Will the doctrine of estoppel apply in a
divorce action when the procuring party seeks collaterally to attack his
own prior divorce? The cases in other jurisdictions conflict on this question
60 L R A. 301, supplemented in 51 L R A. (N s) 535; 109 A L R 1019,
supplemented in 122 A. L R 1323, 140 A L R 915, and 153 A L R 942
The cited A. L R annotations indicate the New York cases tend to distinguish between actions to litigate private rights of the spouses and actions
to adjudicate marital status, holding the doctrine of estoppel applicable in
actions of the former type, but not in the latter-on the theory that in the
latter the interest of the State outweighs any equitable considerations
applicable between private litigants Yet this view is far from universal,
many courts applying the doctrine of estoppel in divorce actions; of these,
however, some hold the procuring party would not be estopped in a situation like that of the Wampler case because the non-procuring party's
behavior gives rise to "an estoppel against an estoppel" Hopkins v
Hopkins, 174 Miss 643, 165 So 414 (1936); Lippincott v Lippincott, 141 Neb
186, 3 N W (2d) 207 (1942) In the Wampler case our Washington court

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL 21

holds that estoppel does not lie; however, failure clearly to delineate the
theory and extent of the holding detracts considerably from its force
The holding could be based on any of three different theories discussed in
the opinion: (1) Even if the doctrine of estoppel applies, the facts do not
warrant finding an estoppel (2) There is "an estoppel against an estoppeL"
(3) The doctrine of estoppel does not apply in an action for adjudication
as to marital status The opinion appears to adopt this last theory
Whether the doctrine of estoppel would apply in an action to adjudicate
private rights, such as property rights of the spouses, remains an open
J McS
question in Washington.
DEPOSITIONS-PERSONs AUTHORIZED TO TAKE DEPosITIoNs OUTSIDE THE STATE.
Action by M, an attorney, to recover against K for the reasonable value of
legal services At the trial, the court admitted into evidence certain
depositions taken outside the state of Washington, by a notary public,
resident of Washington, who had been specially commissioned by the
Spokane County Superior Court to take such depositions, under REv.
REV STAT § 1239 Held: The depositions were illegally taken and therefore
inadmissible, for the court has no jurisdiction to appoint a resident of Washington to take depositions outside the limits of the state Moore v Keesey,
Held on rehearing: The deposi24 Wn (2d) 139, 163 P (2d) 164 (1945)
tions were properly admitted, for the statute must be liberally construed
and the court therefore has jurisdiction to commission a resident of the
state to take a deposition outside the state Moore v Keesey, 126 Wash
Dec 30, 173 P (2d) 130 (1946)
REMR,.Ev STAT § 1239 governs the taking of depositions outside the state
of Washington: "Depositions may be taken outside the state by a judge
or any person authorized by special commission from any court of
this state " The legislature was silent on the question whether a person
authorized by special commission must be an officer of and resident in the
state in which the deposition is to be taken The court decided on rehearing,
that to require the party so commissioned to be a resident of the state in
which the deposition is to be taken would amount to judicial legislation.
The first holding raised the question of the authority of a resident of
Washington to take a deposition outside the state, and concluded that he
had no such authority There is a line of cases in support of this holding
but such of these cases as have come to light involve only persons with
general statutory authority to take depositions and not special commissioners of the court, as in this case Silver v Kansas City, etc Ry, 21 Mo
App 5 (1886); Brant v Mickle & Wetherall, 28 Md 436 (1867); Fonda v
Armour, 49 How Pr (N Y) 72 (1875); 13 CYc 848 On rehearing, the
court followed the view of other jurisdictions that the authority to take
depositions need not be derived from the laws of the state in which the
deposition is to be taken, but is derived from the laws of the state in which
the commission is granted and that the commission carries with it all the
powers necessary to execute it Tompkins v Tompkins, 257 Ill 557, 100
N E 965 (1913), Ann Cas 1914B 158; McGeorge v Walker, 65 Mich 5,
31 N W 601 (1887); Smith v Cokefair, 8 Pa Co Ct R. 45 (1890) This
latter position seems the more sound, for the depositions are for use in the
state where the commission issues; were they sought to be used elsewhere,
B V L
a different question would be presented
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NXGrIGENT IN.TuR--CoMMuNUY LABILIT--CmmLICT OF LAWS D (the
husband) made an automobile trip from his home in Arizona to San Diego,
California, where his wife was convlescing after illness, and in a few days
drove to Los Angeles to confer with parties in connection with the sale
of his separate property in Arizona In returning to San Diego, he followed
a longer route through Venice, California, to accommodate an acquaintance
with whom he had discussed the prospective sale Before reaching Venice,
he collided with another automobile, resulting in injury to P P. had judgment for damages in California (D C S D Cal, 1939), and subsequently,
on the basis of the California judgment, was awarded a judgment in Arizona (D C Ariz, 1942) The instant action was brought to haye the Arizona judgment declared to be an obligation of the community of D and
wife The trial court found that D was engaged on a mission wholly connected with his separate business and not in any way a benefit to the community, and that, therefore, the j.dgment was not a community obligation
P appealed Held: Affirmed Any mere detour which D may have made
was properly found to be insufficient to take him outside the scope of his
separate business, and into the business of the community Babcock v, Tam,
156 F (2d) 116 (C C A. 9th, 1946)
The opinion referred to the similarity between the Arizona state community law relating to the issues of the instant case and the Washington
state law, and quoted with approval from Floding v Denholm, 40 Wash
463, 82 Pac 738 (1905):
"The rule no* is that community property is liable for a
debt created by the husband for the benefit of the community
But such property is not liable for a debt created by a tort of
either spouse, or one which is not for the benefit of the community"
In purporting to follow Washington law, the court made an unfortunate
choice In its statement of the rule of 'looding v Denholm, a case which
dealt with an action on a suretyship obligation and not on tort' The
particular language referred to 'would seem to inlicate that there is no
liability in Washington on the part of the community for tortious acts of
the husband or wife To the contrary, community liability for tort has
long been recognized, Milne v Kane, 64 Wash 254, 118 Pac 659 (1911), and
Is made to turn on whether the actual tort-feasor was, in the commissiqn
of the wrong, acting as representative or agent 6f the community McKay,
Comt*unity Property (2d ed 1925) 554. Whether the husband is acti.ng
as agent is dependent upon whether or not he was acting for the "benefit"
of the community McGregor v Johnson, 58 Wash 78, 107 Pac 1049 (1910)
If the tortious act of the husband be committed for the benefit of the com-

munity, then the community is liable De Phillips IV Nesln, 139 Wash. 51,
245 Pac 749 (1926); Wimmer v Nickolson, 151 Wash 199, 275 Pac 699
(1929); Kangley v Rogers, 85 Wash 250, 147 Pac 898 (1915) Cf Brotton V
Langert, 1 Wash 73, 23 Pac 803 (1890); Kies v Wilkinson, 114 Wash 89,
194 Pac 582 (1921) Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, unless it
can be said that the husband was acting as agent of the community, the
community is not liable Day v Henry, 81 Wash 61, 142 Pac 439 (1914);
Schramm v Steel, 97 Wash 309, 166 Pac 634 (1917); Bergman v State, 187
Wash 622, 60 P (2d) 699 (1930) Where the husband assaulted "another
party in an argument involving the 'husband's sepaiate property, it was
held there was no conceivable benefit to the community, and no liability
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on the part of the community Furuheim v Floe, 188 Wash 368, 62 P (2d)
706 (1936) Insofar as willful torts by the husband are concerned, the
Washington court would seem to have strictly adhered to the test of benefit to the community
Although the Washington court has not expressly distinguished between
willful and negligent torts, there has been a general recognition that the
advent of the automobile and the resulting increase in negligent injury
cases has created special problems and special rules This recognition led
to the early development of the family car doctrine in Washington Birch
v Abercrombie, 74 Wash 486, 133 Pac 1020 (1913) Also, the Washington
court has gone a long way in finding community benefit and therefore
community liability in automobile accident cases, holding it to be beneficial to the community where a husband was driving a car for his own
pleasure, Wicklund v Allraum, 122 Wash 546, 211 Pac 760 (1922); where
a husband was driving a car on a hunting trip, Floyd v Mowery, 158 Wash
341, 290 Pac 710 (1930); and where a husband was driving persons, not
including his wife, to a dance, King v Williams, 188 Wash 350, 62 P (2d)
710 (1936) Also, where the wife was driving the car for her pleasure
liability was imposed in the absence of proof that the car, at the time of the
collision, was not being used for a community purpose Perren v Press,
196 Wash 14, 81 P (2d) 867 (1938) In Werker v Knox, 197 Wash 453, 85
P (2d) 1041 (1938), our court indicated the trend of recent cases in saying:
"It is in those cases where the husband has caused a negligent injury through the use of an automobile that the tendency
of the courts to go to the extreme limit to fix liability upon the
community has been most clearly exhibited "
In the instant case, the court found that the trip from Arizona to California, in its entirety, was an individual enterprise of D, in that the motivating factor of the trip was to see persons in Los Angeles in regard to his
separate property The fact that D was returning to San Diego to see his
wife was not deemed sufficient to change the character of the trip to one
of pleasure, and thereby bring this case into accord with those holding that
trips of such a nature are for the benefit of the community Wicklund
v Allraum, supra; Floyd v Mowery, supra; King v Williams, supra The
trend of the law in Washington however, has not been toward relieving
the community from liability for the torts of its individual members, but
has been definitely in the direction of finding ways and means of imposing
such liabilities upon the community It would seem, therefore, that where
the husband made a trip for the mixed purpose of visiting his wife and
transacting business in connection with his separate property, the court
could have found community benefit and therefore community liability,
and still have been safely within the "extreme limit" referred to in Werker
v Knox, supra
There is also presented an important conflict of laws problem Although the tort was committed in California, the trial court applied the
community property law of Arizona to determine whether or not the community is liable This conclusion is in direct conflict with that reached by
the Washington court in Mountan v Price, 20 Wn (2d) 129, 146 P (2d) 327
(1944), in which it was held that the law of the place where a tort is committed controls questions in connection with the acts the responsibility
therefor, and the nature of the cause of action based thereon. This problem
will be considered further in a forthcoming issue of the RPEviw
DAW

